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I.

Introduction

The Florida banking market is one of the most coveted in the
country.1 The Sunshine State is one of the fastest growing states in the
nation,2 and this growth provides increased deposits in the State's'

banks. As long as this growth continues, new businesses which need
funds to begin operations will be attracted to Florida. In short, the influx of people and businesses into the state insure that Florida will remain a deposit-rich state, requiring large amounts of capital to fund its
continued growth. Because banks depend on both obtaining deposits
and making loans for their existence, the Florida banking market is
quite attractive.
Until recently, Florida excluded out-of-state banks and bank holding companies 3 from its retail banking market. 4 This did not mean that
* B.S., University of North Carolina; J.D., University of Florida. Associate; Abel,
Band, Brown, Russell and Collier, Sarasota, Florida.
1. Brown, Interstate Banking and a Report from the Test Side, 98 BANKING
L.J. 615, 640 (1981).
2. From the previous census count, April 1, 1980, to July 1, 1982, Florida's population is estimated to have climbed from approximately 9,746,000 to 10,416,000, for a
percentage change of 6.9. These increases, when compared to the other states, rank
Florida third in population increase and fourth in percentage increase. UNITED STATES
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS 1983 FLORIDA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 4 (F. Terhune ed.).
3. A bank holding company is presently defined as "any company which has control over any bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company by
virtue of this Act." 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1983). Control is characterized by direct or
indirect control or twenty-five percent or more of any class of voting securities of the
bank or company, or controlling the election of a majority of directors or trustees.
4. Section 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act, commonly referred to as the
Douglas Amendment, prohibits interstate banking unless the state chooses otherwise.
12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1983). Section 658.29 of the Florida statutes buttresses this federal prohibition. FLA. STAT. § 658.29 (1983).
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
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such companies were prohibited from providing other financial ser-

vices. 5 Out-of-state companies have employed trust companies, investment advisory offices, loan production offices, EPT facilities, and other
methods to establish their physical presence in Florida and other
states. 6 Financial giants such as Citicorp and Chemical Bank, two New
York based banks, continue to expand their Florida financial operations. 7 By expanding their Florida wholesale operations, these two
banks, and many other out-of-state banks alike, hope to have established a foothold in Florida when national interstate banking is
allowed. 8
Two recent developments, however, have opened the Florida retail
banking market for a select group of banks. North Carolina National

Bank Corporation (NCNB), the largest bank holding company in the
Southeast, 9 aggressively entered the Florida banking market in 1981.10

5. Financial Services Industry-Oversight: Hearings Before the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Part II, 98th Cong., Ist

Sess. 411 (1983) (statement of William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice) [hereinafter cited as Industry Hearings 11]. McFadden and Douglas prevent banks from providing full service retail banks outside of
their home states. They have not prevented banks from providing a wide variety of
banking or related financial services on an interstate basis. Id.
6. Id. The Florida financial market has also been penetrated in recent times by
out-of-state bank holding companies. In Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447
U.S. 27 (1980), the Supreme Court struck down a Florida statute that prohibited outof-state companies from establishing trust companies or investment advisory services in
Florida. Id. at 53.
7. Tampa Tribune, Sept. 21, 1983, at 6B, col. 1. Citicorp, Inc., the large New
York based banking organization, has established Person-to-Person in Florida, its
Southeast regional headquarters for its consumer lending service. Citicorp also bases
Citicorp Acceptance Corp. and Citicorp Real Estate Investments in Florida, and plans
to relocate its international travelers check processing operation to Tampa. Chemical
Bank of New York owns about 25 percent of Florida National Banks of Florida, Inc.,
in Jacksonville, of which only 4.9 percent is common stock. Id. See also Craddock,
Here Comes Citicorp's Lean, Meran Team, FLA. TREND, May 1984, at 55 (Citicorp's
aggressive strategy in the Florida financial markets).
8. See Financial Services Industry-Oversight: Hearings Before the Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Part 11, 98th Cong.,

1st Sess. 105 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Industry Hearings 1].
9. At year's end 1983, NCNB had total assets of approximately $12.81 billion
dollars and total deposits in excess of $8.81 million dollars. NCNB 1983 Annual Report 1 (1984).
10. AM. BANKER, June 19, 1981, at 23. Chairman Thomas Storrs warned that
banks must take advantage of every opportunity to broaden their market and fit their
products to their customers' needs, or they will find themselves in a bad way in the next
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/1
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NCNB capitalized upon a "grandfather" clause contained in a Florida
statute" that was interpreted as an authorization for NCNB to acquire
commercial banks in Florida. 2 Since NCNB's initial acquisition, the
company has acquired many other banks, the most recent being one of
Florida's largest holding companies. 3

The second development is the Florida legislature's passage of the
"Regional Reciprocal Banking Act of 1984."' 4 This new law authorizes
bank holding companies in other southeastern states'> that pass similar

reciprocal legislation to acquire or merge with Florida banks or bank
holding companies. When the law takes effect,' 6 regional bank holding
companies will eagerly enter the Florida market. 17
Both of these changes illustrate problems that arise when Board or
State action is taken that allows conditional, or limited, interstate

banking. After outlining the regulatory background of geographic bank
restrictions, this article will first examine the interpretive issues created
by Florida's grandfather statute and then analyze the equal protection
issues emanating from the State's new regional banking law. The

problems underlying these legal issues will also be noted. Finally, this
article will explain that while limited interstate banking will be allowed

for the present, and the underlying problems will be ignored, nationwide interstate banking is the inevitable level playing field.

ten years. Id.
11. FLA. STAT. § 658.29(3)(d) (1983). Generally, a grandfather clause is a provision in a new law or regulation exempting those already in, or part of, the existing
system which is being regulated, or an exception to a restriction that allows all those
already doing something to continue doing it even if they would be stopped by the new
regulation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 629 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
12. NCNB, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 54 (1982).
13. The Board approved NCNB's application to acquire Ellis Banking Corporation of Bradenton in NCNB, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 225 (1984).
14. 1984 Fla. Laws 42 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 658.295).
15. The states in the "region" are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia,
West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. Id. § 1.
16. The Act takes effect on July 1, 1985, or the date on which regional states
having twenty percent or more of the total regional banks deposits, excluding Florida,
have enacted and have in effect reciprocal statutes, whichever occurs sooner. Id.
17. Sun Banks and Trust Company of Georgia have announced a merger effective July 1, 1985. The banks will be run independently at first, but plans call for the
merged holding company to be based in Atlanta. Other likely combinations are First
Atlanta and Southeast, and Citizens and Southern Georgia. Talks and Predictions,
FLA. TREND, Aug. 1984, at 24.
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
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Regulatory Background

A fear of too few banks having too much power permeates American banking regulation.' Geographic limitations on bank operations
and expansions reflect this concern. Such limitations on bank holding
companies 9 were specifically addressed in the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956.0 Section 3(d) of the Act, commonly referred to as the
Douglas Amendment, prohibits Federal Reserve Board approval of an
application for an interstate bank acquisition unless the acquisition of
such shares of a state bank by an out-of-state bank holding company is
specifically authorized by the state in which such a bank is located. The
authorization cannot be implicit."' This exemption recognizes the historically weighty state interest in whether or not to allow local banks to
be controlled by out-of-state bank holding companies.22 Expansion
across state lines is permitted only if the host state expressly agrees by
statute.
The Florida legislature, in 1972, supplemented the Douglas
Amendment prohibitions by enacting section 649.141 of the Florida
Statutes. This legislation provided that no out-of-state bank holding
company, bank, or trust company shall acquire, retain, or own the control over any Florida bank or trust company.2" The legislature made
several exceptions to this prohibition. In particular, subsection (3) excepts from the statute's restrictions any bank, trust company, or bank
holding company, the operations of which are principally conducted
outside this state, which, on December 20, 1972, owned all the assets of
or control over a bank or trust company located within and doing business within this state. 4 NCNB based its effort to enter the Florida
banking market on the effect and scope of this subsection.
18. See Haywood, Trade Groups Choose Sides, ECON. REV., May 1983, at 66,
66 (the three specific goals of banking regulation are: to insure market stability, to
prevent undue concentration of market power, and to guard against unfair dealing).
19. See supra note 3.
20. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1983).
21. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1983).
22. Lewis, 447 U.S. at 38. The Court accepted the submission that as a matter
of history and as a matter of present commercial reality, banking is a profound local
concern.
23. FLA. STAT. § 659.141 (1972) (renumbered § 658.29 during the 1980 revision
of the Florida Banking Code).
24. FLA. STAT. § 658.29 (3)(d) (1983).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/1
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III.

Board Action and Interpretive Issues

NCNB applied to purchase the First National Bank of Lake City,
Florida, on June 24, 1981.25 The Federal Reserve Board first considered the legality of the proposed acquisition under state and federal law
before the proposal was evaluated based on the statutory factors contained in section 3(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act.26 Because
the Board received comments questioning NCNB's authority under
section 658.29 and under the Douglas Amendment to acquire First National Bank of Lake City, the proper interpretation of section 658.29
was put at issue.17 In approving NCNB's application, the Board interpreted section 658.29 to specifically authorize NCNB's acquisition of
Florida banks.2" The history and purpose of section 658.29 provides a
starting point for evaluating this administrative decision.
A.

Legislative History of Section 658.29

The Florida financial market remained relatively free from out-ofstate holding companies until 1971. As the desirability of the Florida
market increased, ways to avoid the Douglas Amendment's prohibition
surfaced. Northern Trust Company, an Illinois-based bank holding
company, acquired Security Trust Company of Miami.29 Because interstate acquisitions of trust companies are not prohibited by the Douglas
Amendment, this acquisition was lawful. 30
The legislature responded in 1972 by enacting section 659.141 of
25. AM. BANKER, June 26, 1981, at 3. The application was delivered to the Fifth
District Federal Reserve Bank in Richmond, where the validity was to be checked. The
application would then be sent to Washington for a judgment on the merits by the
Board.
26. NCNB, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 54. Under Whitney National Bank in Jefferson
Parish v. Bank of New Orleans and Trust Company, 379 U.S. 411 (1965), the Board
cannot approve an application if approval would be prohibited by a valid state law. Id.
at 54 n.l.
27. In fact, the original idea for, and basic outline of, the following argument
comes from the comments received from the Florida Bankers Association, State Exchange Bank and Columbia County Bank. See Comments of Florida Bankers Association, The State Exchange Bank, NCNB, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 54 (1982).
28. NCNB, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 59.
29. See Nortrust Corp., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 67 (1972).
30. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1983). The Douglas Amendment only prohibited
the acquisitions of banks, and Florida has no further prohibitions at this time.
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
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the Florida Statutes. 3 ' This statute prohibited out-of-state banking or-

ganizations from owning or acquiring Florida trust companies or investment advisory businesses providing such services to banks or trust
companies. 32 This legislation attempted to close a loophole in federal
banking law33 and keep large, out-of-state banks from entering the lucrative trust business.3 4 For equitable3 5 and legal reasons,3 6 "grandfather" exemptions were added to the new law. In this manner Nortrust

was grandfathered in by virtue of its ownership of Security Trust, and
NCNB was grandfathered in because of its pending application to buy

the Northern Trust Company of Florida.
An increase in pressure on the Florida financial market opened up
loopholes in the newly enacted section 659.141. The Royal Trust Company, a Canadian bank holding company, sought and received the
Board's approval to acquire Inter National Bank of Miami.37 The
Douglas Amendment was inapplicable because Royal Trust was neither
a bank nor a bank holding company under the Bank Holding Company

31. FLA. STAT. § 659.141 (Supp. 1971).
32. Id.
33. Hearings on H.B. 3784 Held Before the House Business Regulation Committee 1 (Mar. 2, 1972) (reference to transcriptions of the tapes of the hearings on
Florida House of Representatives Bill 3874, which became Fla. Laws ch. 72-96 (1970)
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 659.141 (1971), and of which original tapes can be found in
the State of Florida Archives) [hereinafter cited as State House Hearings]. Representative Culbreath, the primary sponsor of the House bill related that the House wanted
to keep the trust business in the State, without having the money siphoned off by outof-state trust companies. This prohibition was designed to accomplish that purpose by
closing the gap in federal law. Id.
34. Hearings on S.B. 916 Held Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 2-3
(Mar. 2, 1972) (reference to transcripts of tapes of hearings on Florida Senate Bill
916). [hereinafter cited as State Senate Hearings]. Bruce Culpepper of the Florida
Association of Bank Holding Companies explained that the loopholes in the law were
allowing out-of-state banks to do indirectly what they were prohibited from doing directly. Id.
35. See Whitehead, Interstate Banking: Taking Inventory, ECON. REV., May
1983, at 4, 5. Because legislatures are usually faced with restricting activities after
innovative organizations have engaged in the activity, in some cases it would be detrimental or impossible to require the organization to cease the activity, even though a
general prohibition is desirable. In these cases, the equitable approach is to allow the
innovative organization to continue, but not expand the questioned activity. Id.
36. See State Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 5. Requiring divesture might
have made the statute illegal.
37. See The Royal Trust Company, 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 665 (1972).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/1
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Act.38 The Board also ruled that the Royal Trust acquisition did not
violate Florida law because "the State's laws did not forbid a foreign
trust company from acquiring control of a national bank operating a
trust department."39
Bankers Trust New York Corporation also sought access to the
Florida financial market. Bankers Trust applied to the Board for approval to establish an investment advisory business in Florida.40 There
was no violation of federal law because an advisory business is not a
bank, but rather, a permitted related activity under the Bank Holding
Company Act. 4 Florida prohibitions were avoided because section
659.141 only forbade out-of-state holding companies from acquiring
such businesses that provide service to Florida banks or trust companies,42 and Bankers Trust planned to provide investment advice to
individuals.43
Before the approval of the Bankers Trust application, however, the
Florida Legislature amended section 649.141 to further prohibit out-ofstate organizations from acquiring Florida holding companies, banks,
or any type of investment advisory business.44 The definition of "holding company" was also broadened so that foreign banks could be
stopped from entering the Florida market.4 5 Again, as with the original
enactment of section 659.141, the purpose of the law was to close loopholes in the state's ban on out-of-state entry into the Florida banking
industry. 46 In addition to noting that the new bill would close the Bankers Trust loophole,47 Representative Hartnett explained during the
38. The term "bank," as defined in section 2 of the Bank Holding Company Act,
does not include banks in foreign countries. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1983).
39.

P.

HELLER, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW 15

n.

274 (1976).
40. See Banker's Trust New York Corporation,59 Fed. Res. Bull. 364 (1973).

41. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1983).
42. See FLA. STAT. § 658.29 (1983).
43. Banker's Trust, 59 Fed. Res. Bull. at 364.

44.
Laws ch.
45.
46.

See FLA. STAT. § 659.141 (1973) (a version of § 659.141 as amended by Fla.
72-726 (1972)).
Id.
Am.BANKER, Dec. 8, 1972, at 2.

47. Proceedings of the House of Representatives ConcerningH.B. 25-A, 4 (Nov.

30, 1972) (transcripts of Florida House floor debate concerning eventual amendment to
FLA. STAT. § 659.141, available in State of Florida Archives) [hereinafter cited as
Florida House Debate]. Hartnett observed that the legislators did not foresee the possibility of out-of-state organizations establishing investment advisory services. This
amendment would prevent future entities from entering Florida in the same manner as
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
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House debate that the new bill would still prohibit out-of-state financial
institutions from purchasing Florida banking institutions.48
The critical change in section 659.1412 came with the amendment
of the section's exceptions. The legislature added subsection (3)(g) to
provide that the prohibitions and restrictions of the section shall not
apply to any bank, trust, company, or holding company, the operations
of which are principally conducted outside this state, who, upon the
effective date of this act owned all the assets of, or control over, a bank
or trust company located within and doing business within the state.4 9
The purpose of this subsection, the current subsection (3)(d) of section
658.29, is to prevent the bill from being unconstitutional because of its
retroactive effect on existing contracts."
B.

Authorization Under Florida and Federal Law

Substantively, the Board's ruling that Florida law allowed NCNB
to buy a Florida bank may be lacking in several respects. The Board
ruled that since section 658.29 was clear and unambiguous on its face,
legislative intent must be derived from the words. 1 However, there is
case law holding that legislative intent must guide the court and be
given effect, even though that intent may contradict the strict letter of
the statute. 52 Whenever possible, the court's construction of a statute
should include the statute's legislative history, the evil to be corrected,
an indication of the intent of the legislature, the nature of the subject
regulated, and the object sought to be obtained.53
The history of section 658.29 reveals that Florida desired to fill in
the gaps of the Douglas Amendment's prohibitions and not to enlarge

did Bankers Trust. Id.
48. Id. at 5-6. Representative Hartnett explained that out-of-state organizations
"cannot now, purchase a banking institution, in the stock exchange or any other form
like that [sic]." Id.
49. See FLA. STAT. § 659.141(3)(g) (1973) (renumbered § 658.29 during the
1980 session).
50. See Florida House Debate, supra note 47, at 8-9.
51. NCNB, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 56-57. See also Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815
(Fla. 1976); State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
52. See State v. Webb, 398 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1981) (legislative intent is the
polestar by which court must be guided, and this intent must be given effect even
though it may contradict strict letter of statute).
53. Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jones, 408 So. 2d 769, 771 (Fla. 2nd Dist.
Ct. App. 1982). See also 2A SOUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4803 (4th
ed. 1982).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/1
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out-of-state banking companies' rights.54 Legislators were forced to let

in Royal Trust because it was already operating in Florida, 55 but
wanted to put a stop to such future acquisitions. To accomplish this,
the grandfather clause, or current section 658.29(3)(d), had to parallel
the expanded prohibitions in the main statute. The clear intent was to
allow these organizations to continue to conduct business that was now

unlawful under Florida law. 56 Florida had approved ten previous acquisitions by the two other grandfathered organizations.5"However, each

of these acquisitions involved the same type of Florida organization as
the acquiring institution had owned prior to the grandfather date. 58
Nothing in the legislative history evinces an intent to allow the

grandfathered organizations to expand into businesses in which they
were not then engaged.

The other half of the interpretive issue is whether section 658.29
suffices under federal law as a specific authorization for out-of-state

bank holding companies to acquire Florida banks.59 In answering this
question affirmatively, the Board relied on a Court of Appeals interpretation of a similar Iowa statute.60 In that case, the reviewing court

agreed with a Board's ruling which implicitly accepted the sufficiency
of the authorization under the Douglas Amendment of an Iowa statute." The Iowa statute provided that nothing in the statutes should be
construed to authorize an out-of-state bank holding company to acquire

any interest in any Iowa bank, unless such bank holding company was,
54. See supra notes 31-50 and accompanying text. See also BT Investment Managers, Inc. v. Lewis, 559 F.2d 950, 954 n.13 (5th Cir. 1977) (characterized FLA. STAT.
§ 659.141 as a brazen attempt to stop out-of-state competition).
55. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. See also AM. BANKER, Dec.
8, 1972, at 2. The bill was an outgrowth of unsuccessful efforts to keep the $1.9 billionasset Royal Trust Company of Montreal from acquiring Inter National Bank of
Miami.
56. State Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 5. Culpepper voiced his concern
that requiring divesture of something already approved is legally questionable. He felt
an amendment grandfathering in the organizations would be an acceptable solution. Id.
57. NCNB, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 59.
58. Id. at 56-57 n.10. The Board also noted that nothing in the statute restricts a
grandfathered company's acquisitions to the grandfathered activity. Because the statute refers to "bank and trust company" in the alternative, the Board concluded that
the grandfathered company can acquire banks and trust companies. Id.
59. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1983).
60. NCNB, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 59.
61. See Iowa Independent Bankers v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 511 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
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on January 1, 1971, registered with the Federal Reserve Board as a
bank holding company, and on that date owned at least two banks in
the state.6 2
The Board relied on the fact that the Florida statute was couched
in the same language as the Iowa statute, which is an exception to a
prohibition on interstate banking acquisitions.6 3 But this does not necessarily mean that the Florida statute is a specific authorization. The
Iowa statute states that if certain grandfathering criteria were met,
then the statute specifically authorized that qualifying out-of-state
holding companies could acquire Iowa banks. The legislative history of
the Iowa statute makes this intent to authorize an acquisition clear. 6 1 It
is questionable, indeed unlikely, that section 658.29 can be read the
same way. A logical reading of section 648.29(3)(2) would mean removing NCNB from the section's prohibitions, but leaving no authorization.6 5 The federal prohibitions would, therefore, still bar NCNB
from acquiring Florida banks.

C.

Continuing Problems from Such Board Actions

Although NCNB probably should not have been initially allowed
to expand into the Florida commercial banking market, that expansion
is a fact. 16 However, the NCNB decision, as well as subsequent decisions, illustrates that problems arise from these Board actions. Board
decisions on interstate bank expansion may not always be consistent
with the relevant state policy on interstate banking. In some cases, the
Board may even believe they are constrained by the Act to approve a
proposal that potentially may undermine the Act's policies. 67 In addi-

62. IOWA CODE § 524.1805 (Supp. 1974-1975).
63. NCNB, Fed. Res. Bull. at 59.
64. See Iowa Independent Bankers, 511 F.2d at 1294-95.
65. The Board also relied on the fact that Florida had treated the language in
FLA. STAT.

§ 658.29 as a specific authorization. NCNB, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 59. But

the Board is confusing issues, because this question was not raised by the expansion
within Florida of Nortrust or of Royal Trust. Royal Trust was a foreign bank company
and not subject to the Douglas Amendment. Northern Trust's acquisitions were not
subject to Douglas because Northern acquired trust companies.

66. Laches would bar a suit if there is unreasonable delay in bringing suit, and
prejudice is caused by the delay. Independent Bankers Association of America v. Heimann, 627 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1980). More important, however, is the nature of this
ruling and others like it.
67.

See U.S. Trust Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 371, 372 (1984).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/1
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tion to NCNB, U.S. Trust6" illustrates these problems.
U.S. Trust Corporation, a New York bank holding company, applied for Board approval to add the acceptance of time and demand
deposits and the making of consumer loans to the activities of its Palm
Beach subsidiary, U.S. Trust Company.6 9 This proposal was not prohibited by the Douglas Amendment because the Florida subsidiary
would not be a bank as defined in section 2(c) of the Bank Holding
Company Act. No commercial loans would be made by U.S. Trust
Company." The Board recognized the possibility of abuse of the Act's
policies, 71 but nevertheless approved the application.7 2 The dissent
stated that approval would have the practical effect of allowing interstate banking without the express authorization of the state law. 3
Therefore, the dissent viewed the Board as not being limited by the
technical "bank" definition, but rather as possessing authority to deny
the application by using its broad discretionary powers to prevent eva74
sions of the Act.
Agreement or disagreement with the NCNB and U.S. Trust rulings is not the end of the problem. Inherent in these Board rulings is
the decision to allow interstate banking for certain bank holding companies. These rulings are not always in accord with state policy and
may threaten the efficacy of the Douglas Amendment.7 5 Additionally,
banks that remain excluded from a state market, as they are from Florida's will begin to question the legitimacy of this piecemeal approach. 6

68. Id.
69. Id. at 371.
70. Id. at 372.
71. Id. The Board reaffirmed its views that an institution that is chartered as a
bank and accepts transaction accounts from the public should be subject to the Act's
policies.
72. Id. at 373. Approval was subject to three conditions that the Board felt
would ensure U.S. Trust's compliance with § 3(d).
73. Id. at 374 (dissenting statement of Governor Rice).
74. Id.
75. In addition to U.S. Trust, four more bank holding companies have received
permission to operate Florida "no-bank banks," and several hundred such applications
are pending nationwide. Regulators deplore the trend of this de facto interstate banking, but believe present law provides no hurdles to the developments. State legislators
are beginning to fear that, in this manner, money center banks will have dominance
before a substantial number of regional banks can be established. Magnusson,
Lawmakers Gingerly Circle the Hot Non-Bank Bank Issue, FLA. TREND, July 1984, at

23.
76.

Bank of New York (BNY) applied to acquire a Connecticut bank, using
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State Action and the Regional Reciprocal Banking Act

Florida recently chose to expressly allow certain bank holding
companies in the Southeast 77 to enter the Florida banking market. Entry for the privileged states was provided by the passage of the Regional Reciprocal Banking Act of 1984.78 The Regional Act authorizes
the acquisition or merger of a Florida bank or bank holding company
by or with a bank holding company whose principal place of business is
within the region, but only if the laws of the other state permit the
reciprocal acquisition of banks or bank holding companies in that state
by Florida bank holding companies.7 9 The Regional Act is similar to
the regional legislation previously passed by several New England
states. 80 The relevant New England statutes have already been used to
support a few New England interstate transactions, 8 ' and at least one
southeastern merger that will become effective on the Regional Act's
effective date 82 has been announced. 83
The rationale for the Regional Act is that it will enable banks in
the Southeast to merge and strengthen themselves against takeover attempts by money-center banks when nationwide interstate banking is
Connecticut's enactment of a regional statute as authority. BNY argued that by this
enactment, the Douglas Amendment's prohibitions were lifted, and therefore that all
bank holding companies could now enter Connecticut. The Board rejected this argument, saying that BNY's position was based almost entirely on a textual analysis of the
Douglas Amendment that, if accepted, would undermine state policies. See Bank of
New York Co., Inc., 70 Fed. Reg. Bull. 527 (1984). But query, why other applications
based on a textual analysis, such as NCNB and U.S. Trust, have succeeded.
77. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
78. 1984 Fla. Laws 42 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 658.295).
79. This Act expressly overrides Florida's prohibition on interstate banking for
the regional status. An "anti-leapfrogging" provision is included that requires divesture
of any Florida bank or bank holding company by any other bank holding company that
ceases to be a regional bank.
80. See 1983 Conn. Acts 411 (Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167A, §
2 (West Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 19-30-1, 19-30-2 (1984).
81. Bank of Boston Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 524 (1984); Bank of New England
Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374 (1984); Hartford Nat'l Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 353
(1984). A United States Court of Appeals stayed the effectiveness of the Board's Orders in Bank of New England and Hartford, pending the court's decision on constitutional issues raised by Citicorp and other protestants. In view of that decision, the
Board stayed the effectiveness of its Bank of Boston order. Bank of Boston Corp., 70
Fed. Res. Bull. 584 (1984).
82. See supra note 16.
83. See supra note 17.
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inevitably permitted. 84 The effect of the Act, however, is that southeastern banks may now compete in Florida to the exclusion of banks in
all of the other states. Constitutional guarantees arise, given the discriminatory nature of such a law.8 The issue is whether these state
laws limiting entry into the states to "regional" bank holding companies are permissible under the United States Constitution. Although
the issue raises questions under the Commerce Clause 6 and the Com-

pact Clause,

7

this article will test the Regional Act against the Equal

88
Protection Clause.

A.

The Traditional Test for Economic Regulation
The fourteenth amendment commands that no state shall deny a

person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the law. 89 This doctrine prohibits a state's unequal treatment of persons, absent adequate
justification. 90 Courts have articulated three justification standards: the

two traditional tiers of the rational relation test, the compelling interest
84. See Graham Leads the Interstate Charge, FLA. TREND, Oct. 1983, at 26.
Florida does not view the markets in those states as presenting big banking opportur.ities, but rather, as a chance to promote regional mergers that will strengthen ther
Southeast's banks.
85. The constitutionality of the New England regional reciprocal laws is presently being litigated. See infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The legal evaluation under the commerce
clause turns on whether the Douglas Amendment allows a state to discriminate against
out-of-state bank holding companies on the basis of their location. One view is that the
Douglas Amendment eliminates any commerce clause problems. See, e.g., Hawke, Are
State Laws Permitting Interstate Banking Constitutional? AM. BANKER, Dec. 15,

1982, at 4, col. I. Another view suggests that the Douglas Amendment cannot support
the right of a state to burden interstate commerce by deciding which states may enter
its territory. See Golembe, Massachusetts and Interstate Banking, 2 BANKING EXPANSION REP., 1, 1 (No. 2 1983).
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. A compact clause violation would be found if
the scheme would have a tendency to increase the political power of the states in a way
that would encroach upon federal supremacy. United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate
Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 471 (1978) (quoting Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503,
519 (1983); New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369 (1976). However, Congress
could consent to the legislation.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
89. Id.
90. McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisons-FundamentalRight to Travel
or "Newcomers" as a Suspect Class?, 28 VAND. L. REV. 987, 988 (1975). See also
Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341

(1949).
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test, and the sliding scale of strictness test.9' The rational relation test
is applied in the area of economic regulation when no fundamental
right or suspect classification is involved.92 The test has been stated to
mean that the statute must reasonably relate to a valid state purpose
and will only be held unconstitutional in violation of the equal protection clause when the classification results in arbitrarily disparate treat-

ment.93 The Supreme Court took such a deferential approach in City of
New Orleans v. Duke.94 The Court upheld the grandfather clause to a
New Orleans ordinance which excepted from the ordinance's prohibition against street vendors in the French Quarter those vendors who
had continuously worked in the Quarter for eight years. 95 The Court
characterized the ordinance and its grandfather clause as solely an economic regulation, and then stated that in this area, the judiciary may
not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations.9 6 The Court then applied the rationality
test to the grandfather clause and found that the city's objective was
legitimate, 97 and that the city's classification rationally furthered that
objective. 98 Therefore, the ordinance was not a constitutionally impermissible denial of equal protection.9 9
City of New Orleans illustrates the doctrine that courts will give
only cursory scrutiny to purely economic regulations attacked under

91. See San Antonio Indep. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 97-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REv. 41,
115-19 (1974).
92. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
93. In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1980).
94. 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
95. Id. at 304. The two vendors who qualified under the grandfather clause had
operated in the area for over 20 years, rather than eight. Id. at 305. The appellee had
operated in the French Quarter for two years before the ordinance was amended. Id. at
298.
96. Id. at 303. Wide latitude is given states in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with less than
mathematical exactitude. Id.
97. Id. at 304. The objective of the provision was to "preserve the appearance
and custom valued by the Quarter's residents and attractive to tourists." Id.
98. Id. at 304-05. The Court held that the ends fo the City's means were rational: banning all vendors who had not become part of the distinctive charm of the
Quarter and who had not built up substantial reliance interests in continued operation.
A step by step approach, such as this, to solving problems will be upheld. Id.
99. Id. at 305. Note, also, that the Court overruled Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457
(1957) because of that case's testing a statute's potential irrationality. Id. at 306.
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the equal protection clause.1"' But a rational relation to a legitimate
governmental object must still exist. Although testing the constitution-

ality of state laws which discriminate in favor of a region is a novel
issue, 1 1 reasoning in other cases is useful to hypothesize how courts
would apply the rational relation test to Florida's Regional Act.

B.

Florida's Regional Act
In Iowa Independent Bankers v. Board of Governors of the Fed-

eral Reserve System,102 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
evaluated an equal protection claim somewhat similar to the instant
issue. Iowa Independent Bankers involved a petition by an association
of over four hundred Iowa banks to set aside a Federal Reserve Board
order approving the acquisition of two Iowa banks by Northwest Bancorporation."0 3 The basis of Northwest's acquisition, as well as the lawsuit, was the previously mentioned Iowa statute. 04 This statute prohib-

ited out-of-state holding companies from acquiring Iowa banks unless
such companies had owned, since 1971, at least two Iowa banks.' 05
When the statute was raised and passed in 1972, only Northwest qualified for this exception.' 0 6 No other out-of-state holding company owned

any Iowa banks.' 0 7 The Iowa association first objected to the proposed
Northwest acquisition, and upon Board approval appealed, arguing
that the statute violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth

amendment. 10 8 The court rejected the association's argument and found
100. See id. The Court acknowledged, however, that different principles govern
even economic regulations when constitutional provisions such as the commerce clause
are implicated. As to what principles apply, the Court does not say, but it seems an
intermediate standard would be applied because the regulation still falls short of affecting a fundamental right or a suspect class. Id. at 304 n.5.
101. See Bank of New England Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374, 379 app. (1984).
102. 511 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
103. Id. at 1291. Some of the Association's members were new competitors of
Northwest after the Board's ruling.
104. IowA CODE § 524.1805 (Supp. 1974-1975).
105. Id.
106. Iowa Independent Bankers, 511 F.2d at 1292.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1292-94. The legality of the statute, then, was the basic issue. The
Board refused to rule on the constitutionality of the statute under the authority of
Whitney National Bank in Jefferson Parish v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379
U.S. 411 (1965). Whitney allows the Board to consider the applicability and effect of
State legislation, but the constitutional validity of that legislation is presumed. Objec-
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no equal protection violation." 9
The appeals court agreed with Iowa that the state had a legitimate

interest in protecting its banking structure from outside bank holding
companies.11 The question was whether Northwest could be excepted
from the general prohibition of out-of-state bank holding companies
without violating the equal protection clause. The crux of the court's

decision was the finding that the Iowa legislature intended Northwest
be allowed to compete in the Iowa market on the same basis as other
Iowa banks."' This allowance was due to Northwest's pre-existing
stake in the Iowa banking system." 2 As the court noted, the precise
intent of the Iowa legislature was to treat Northwest as a domestic
bank holding company." 3 Thus, the court adopted two classifications:

(1) those bank holding companies with an existing stake in Iowa banking and (2) those companies with no stake in Iowa banking. Such a

classification was supported by a rational basis, and is the type of
grandfathering that has been repeatedly approved by the Supreme
Court." 4 City of New Orleans also recognized the validity of such reasoning when it stated that the city could validly grandfather in vendors
who had become part of the distinctive character and charm that distinguishes the Vieux Carr6." 9

tions to the constitutionality are properly cognizable only by the judiciary. Id. at 129293.
109. Id. The petitioner's initial error, the court said, was the incorrect definition
of the classes created by the statute. That the line drawn by the statute on its face,
between out-of-state banks owning less than two banks and those owning two or more
banks, is without consequence, because of the realities of the Iowa market. Id. at 1295.
110. Id. at 1294; See also American Trust Co., Inc. v. South Carolina State Bd.
of Bank Control, 381 F. Supp. 313, 320 (D.S.C. 1975). See generally 8 MICHIE,
BANKS AND BANKING, ch. 17 (1971).
111. Iowa Bankers, 511 F.2d at 1294.
112. The court recognized that the pre-existing state in the Iowa banking system
was obtained "by virtue of past ownership of in-state banks." Id. (emphasis in

original).
113. Id. The court quotes from a report by the joint legislative committee that
drafted the Iowa banking legislation to pinpoint the legislature's intent. The committee
stated that it was undesirable to leave the state's banking structure open to outside
entry, but that Northwest had demonstrated its good standing in the Iowa community
and should be treated as a domestic bank holding company.
114. Id. at 1295. The court observed that the legislature intended to allow all
pre-existing bank holding companies, whether in or out-of-state, to compete on an
equal basis, while preventing any new out-of-state entries into the Iowa banking market. Id. Cf., supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
115. City of New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 305. It is interesting to note that the
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/1

16

Dunlap: Interstate Banking Developments in Florida: Pushing Through Legal

1984]

Interstate Banking Developments

The foregoing rulings sustain the power of the states to be reasonably selective in permitting out-of-state bank holding company entry." 6
But using this rationale to support the Regional Act is difficult, if not
impossible. Regional reciprocal legislation, unlike the common custom
of grandfathering, discriminates on a novel basis.Y17 The concept of reciprocify connotes some feeling of fairness, but the relationship between
a state's interest in controlling its banking structure and a state's securing of reciprocal entry rights is not entirely clear." 8 Reciprocity, as a
basis for excluding some out-of-state banks, becomes even less credible
when a state imposes further conditions, such as location within a particular region, which effectively preclude many states from
eligibility." 9
Similar problems exist with the regional concept. In Lewis v. BT
Investment Managers, Inc., 2 0 the Supreme Court struck down a Florida law which contained language that prohibited out-of-state acquisitions of trust companies and investment advisory businesses. The Court
reasoned that, although states are permitted to regulate matters of legitimate local concern, states may not promote economic protectionalism. 121 Furthermore, the Court observed that the power given to the
states under the Bank Holding Company Act' 22 applied only to legisla-

NCNB ruling could have been susceptible to an equal protection attack. NCNB only
owned one trust company in Florida; NCNB had no pre-existing stake in Florida's
banking market and was neither a positive nor a negative force in that market. Hence,
allowing NCNB to compete in the Florida banking market to the exclusion of other
out-of-state bank holding companies was not supported by a rational basis.
116. See Hawke, supra note 86, at 18, col. 3.
117. V. APILADO, G. BENSTON, J. DAVID, R. EISENBEIS, L. FRIEDER, T. GEls, P.
HORVITZ, H. ROSENBLUM, & D. WHITEHEAD, INTERSTATE BANK EXPANSION: MARKET
FORCES AND COMPETITIVE REALITIES, THE REPORT OF THE FLORIDA INTERSTATE

197 (1984) [hereinafter cited as FLORIDA BANKING STUDY].
118. Hawke, supra note 86, at 18 col. 3. Reciprocity has been accepted as a
legitimate state interest, however, in cases involving professional licensing requirements. See, e.g. Hawkins v. Moss, 503 F.2d 1171 (4th Cir. 1974) (lawyers); Fales v.
Commissioner on Licensure to Prac. Heal. Art, 275 A.2d 238 (D.C. 1971) (doctors);
Mercer v. Hemmings, 194 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1967) (accountants).
119. Hawke, supra note 86.
120. 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
121. Id. (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
Whatever the test for commerce clause limitations upon the states, the Court has consistently distinguished between outright protectionism, and more indirect burdens of
BANKING STUDY GROUP

trade. Id.
122.

12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1983).
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tion operating within the commerce clause. 2 ' Therefore, it is questionable whether a decision by a state as to which among the fifty states it
shall allow to enter its territory is a legitimate state interest at all."2 4
Short of this stance, one could argue that a regional approach is legitimate because such an approach will maintain a responsive, local banking system. But the legitimacy of the regional approach does not seem
to depend on the rational choosing of the region. 12 5 The New England
regional grouping illustrates that the probable result will be the careful
exclusion of states, such as New York, with money-center banks. 2 6
That the regions being created are based on protectionist fears and not
on natural market areas is illustrated by the fact that Utah has
adopted a bill creating a Western region excluding California - but
27
including Alaska and Hawaii.

C.

Continuing Problems from Regional Reciprocal Acts
The legal resolution of the constitutional questions raised by Flor-

ida's Regional Reciprocal Act will not end the issue. 12 s The underlying
isue is discrimination against certain out-of-state bank holding compa-

nies. This problem will continue even if courts decide that Congress, by
passing the Douglas Amendment in 1956, has cloaked state efforts to

discriminate

against

non-regional

banks

with

constitutional

123. Id. at 49. The Court found that although the BHC Act does reserve to the
states a general power to enact banking regulations, nothing suggests the states were
extended powers beyond federal law. Id. at 48-49.
124. Cf. Golembe, supra note 86, at 13 (nothing in the Douglas Amendment or
the "states rights" provision of the Bank Holding Company Act supports the right of a
state to burden interstate commerce by such a decision).
125. But cf. FLORIDA BANKING STUDY, supra note 117, at 197-98, 209 n.38.
Professor Davis feels that the identity of the region must be chosen rationally, but that
it would be difficult to show that the states were selected so irrationally as to violate the
equal protection clause.
126. See Golembe, supra note 86, at 13. New York was excluded from the New
England region, and the guess is that other states with money-center banks, such as
Illinois and California, will be carefully excluded. Id.
127. THE FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPETITIVE EQUITY ACT-REPORT OF THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS S. Rep. No. 560,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 104, 110 (1984) (additional views of Senator D'Amato) [hereinafter cited as COMPETITIVE EQUITY ACT REPORT].
128. See Golembe, supra note 86, at 11. Argumentation and litigation of the
issue under any of the constitutional theories ultimately will be of little import, although resolution may have some impact on the timing of change.
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immunity. 29
A recent United States Court of Appeals decision has, in fact, upheld the New England regional scheme against constitutional attack. 3 '
In Northwest Bancorp. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 13 ' the petitioners'3 2 appealed from three Federal Reserve
Board orders that approved mergers pursuant to sections 3 and 4(c)(8)
of the Bank Holding Company Act. 33 The petitioners charged that the
Massachusetts and Connecticut regional statutes3 4 impermissibly dis-

criminated against non-New England bank holding companies, thereby
violating the equal protection clause. 3 5 The court held that the two
states may be concerned that local banks could become dominated by

New York or Chicago banks, cited Iowa Independent Bankers, and
found no equal protection clause violation.

36

This decision will not be the end of the legal issue.' 37 It will be
interesting to note whether future court decisions will give more than
cursory attention to the underlying problem of such blatant state dis-

crimination against certain out-of-state bank holding companies. If
courts choose to address this problem, the equal protection clause is

probably the best constitutional argument available to strike regional
reciprocal legislation. 38
129. Id.
130. Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 740 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1984).
131. Id.
132. The petitioners in this consolidated action are Citicorp, Northeast Bancorp,
and Northeast's subsidiary bank, Union Trust Company. Id. at 3.
133. See supra note 81.
134. 1983 Conn. Acts 411 (Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167A, § 2
(West Supp. 1982).
135. Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 210. Petitioners also alleged violations of
the commerce and compact clauses. Id.
136. Id. at 13.
137. A petition for certiorari has been filed in the Northeast Bancorp. case. See
supra note 130. Also, other regional schemes may be challenged after they are passed.
138. The standard for permissible, discriminatory state action under the equal
protection clause is less stringent than that under the commerce clause. Bank of New
England Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. app. 385 (1984). However, finding a commerce
clause violation would probably mean that no conditions at all would be tolerated. Also,
any compact clause violations could be remedied by Congressional approval. The equal
protection clause would be more flexible in that some entry conditions could be found
rationally related to a legitimate state interest, while other conditions could be struck.
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V.* Toward a Level Playing Field
Apart from the legal issues raised by recent interstate banking developments in Florida, there exists the idea of a level playing field. A
level playing field, as used in banking regulation, means having the
same rules for all financial regulations so that competition on an equal
footing exists. 139 The level playing field concept explains why the legal
and underlying problems involved with Florida's interstate banking developments have been given little thought and; therefore, why present
developments will be tolerated for a time. However, the concept also
commands that, ultimately, action must be taken to recognize full-scale
interstate banking and to remove the discrimination against excluded
out-of-state bank holding companies.
A.

The Short-Term Field

Market pressures have made interstate banking substantively a reality. 14 0 This de facto interstate banking has been forced by regulatory
loopholes, unregulated competition, and technical innovations. 4' Important regulatory loopholes include a bank holding company's permission to acquire no-bank subsidiaries,' 42 and the existence of loan production offices 143 and Edge Act Corporations. 44 Imaginative thinking,
spurred largely by market pressures, will continue to uncover new ways
to sidestep outdated legal barriers. Non-bank financial institutions are
offering a growing array of services to their customers and are competing directly with banks in many areas. 45 But these organizations are
"unregulated" and can compete nationwide. 46 Finally, new technologi139.

See Garn, Legislation and FinancialService Deregulation:The Level Play-

ing Field, J.
140.

CASH MGMT.,

Apr.-May 1983, at 20, 25.

This has led some to argue that the issue now is "interstate deposit taking."

FLORIDA BANKING STUDY,

supra note 117, at 220.

141. Id. at 155.
142. Id. Because non-bank subsidiaries are free to open offices on an interstate
basis, bank holding companies can use them to evade interstate prohibitions.
143. Id. at 156. These offices cannot make loans or accept deposits; but they can
solicit loans.
144. Id. These Corporations provide banking services related to international
trade and can be used outside of a bank holding company's home state.
145. The money market mutual fund is the principal innovation used to collect
retail deposits on a national level. The real significance of these funds is that they have
broken down the local bank dependency of some customers. Id. at 35.
146. See Whitehead, supra note 35, at 8. Commercial banks are the only
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habits and rendering geocal forces are changing the public's banking
14 7
archaic.
restrictions
graphic expansion
These outside forces indicate that existing geographic restrictions
on banks are ineffective and, more importantly, that banks are suffering from these restrictions.14 8 In addition, studies show that the re-

laxing of interstate barries is independently desirable in terms of public
policy. 149 Considerations such as convenience and needs, quantity and

quality of service, small bank viability, safety and soundness, and competition and concentration will be positively influenced by interstate
50
banking.
Internal and external pressures, therefore, indicate that interstate
banking is both inevitable and preferable. The two interstate banking
developments in Florida are recognitions of this fact. The Board expressly acknowledged the pressures and realities involved by stating in
U.S. Trust that "it would be ineffective and inequitable to impose a
competitive limitation only on bank holding companies by denying this
proposal."' 5 ' Such actions relax interstate prohibitions, thereby pushing
banks in the right direction. 52
Board and State actions encouraging limited interstate banking
seem to be the accepted short-run path to a geographically level field.
Eventually, congressional consent to state laws that permit limited in-

financial service suppliers effectively constrained geographically today.
147. An interstate retail electronic banking system is still being put together,
despite the legal interpretation that an automated teller machine is a branch. Other
technological developments continue to erode geographical barriers. FLORIDA BANKING
STUDY,

supra note 117, at 159.

148. The geographic restrictions today adversely affect banks in that the rules no
longer protect banks from outside competition, but instead prevent them from following
their customers or attracting new customers over the geographic range of their competitors. Eisenbeis, Regional Forcesfor Interstate Banking, ECON. REv., May 1983, at
24, 28.

149. See, e.g.,

FLORIDA BANKING STUDY,

supra note 117 at 211-36.

150. See id. at 160, 222; See also Rhoades and Savage, Can Small Banks Compete?, BANKERS MAG., Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 59 (the study analyzed the ability of small
banks to compete with large banks by reviewing four crucial areas: growth, profitability, economies of scale, and EFT; the evidence and actual performance of small banks
indicate small banks are viable competitors).
151. U.S. Trust, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 372.
152. Since non-bank financial institutions have no geographic limitations, the
"right" direction required is facing market realities and easing geographic restrictions
on banks. Reversing the trend of deregulation by placing restrictions on institutions
such as Merrill Lynch and Sears is not feasible. Edwards, Commercial Banking Review: Geographic Expansion, U.S. BANKER, March 1981, at 18, 26.
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terstate expansion may be forthcoming.' 5 But the very nature of these
two regulators suggests that the discrimination from such action will
continue. Congressional action is needed.
B.

The Eventual Level Field

Congressional inaction to date has been evident. The Depository
Institutions Act of 1982,154 heralded as the most far-reaching federal
banking law in fifty years, did almost nothing for interstate banking.1 55
Such inaction cannot continue much longer. Recent Board orders show
the inadequacies of interstate banking decisions that must turn on the
technical language and intent of the Douglas Amendment.' 56 Regional
Acts are particularly troublesome because of their increasing acceptance and pure discriminatory effort. Congressional action would provide guidance to the Board and states that wish to allow interstate
banking.
The Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System has called for a fresh congressional review of interstate banking
policy. 1 7 The Chairman cited problems with the developing de facto
interstate banking system and the movement towards regional arrangements as the major reasons a new look is needed.' 5 8 Other authority
believes that the emerging regional systems will deliver the final shock
to the nation's banking system that will rouse Congress from its advanced state of paralysis. 59 Congress will not stand by and see the
states carve up the banking system into dukedoms, all in the name of
states rights and the Douglas Amendment. 6 0

153. See COMPETITIVE EQUITY ACT REPORT, supra note 127, at 48. The Committee recognized that while legal arguments are not frivolous, they believe regional
statutes are consistent with the constitution. Id.
154. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320,
96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified in various parts of 12 U.S.C.).
155. See Hawke, supra note 86, at 4, col. 2. The only interstate provision was
the one for the extraordinary acquisitions of failing banks in very limited circumstances. Id.
156. See supra notes 51-76 and accompanying text.
157. Statements to Congress, Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance,
and Urban Affairs, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 561, 567 (1984) (statement of Chairman Volcker, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
158. Id.
159. Golembe, supra note 86, at 11. In this sense, the author applauds the Massachusetts action.
160. Id. at 14.
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Congressional action will make possible the eventual level playing
field. Congress may choose to recognize regional banking as a transitional step in the right direction, but it must ultimately recognize interstate banking as the level playing field. The realities of interstate bank161
ing cannot be avoided, delayed, or arrested by action or inaction.
Regional configurations are inadequate for the same economic reasons
that state barriers are now undesirable.1 62 Today's financial world dictates that the answer must be nationwide banking. 1 3 Additionally, only
when nationwide banking is permitted will the underlying discrimination against the excluded bank holding companies be removed.

VI.

Conclusion

Interstate banking developments in Florida illustrate both the
trends of gebgraphic deregulation and the problems associated with
these trends. Board decisions will continue to open up state banking
markets to those imaginative out-of-state bank holding companies that
discover loopholes in existing state and federal law. Also, states dissatisfied with the pace or direction of these Board decisions will continue
to enact laws that permit their own desired form of limited interstate
banking. Both actions raise legitimate legal objections. However, developments will be permitted for a time because of increasing market
pressures for interstate banking and congressional inaction.
Nevertheless, the underlying problems of a lack of a current national banking policy and the increasing discrimination against states
with money-center banks must eventually be addressed. Ideally, the developing economic balkanization will shock Congress into a fresh review of its interstate banking policy, causing Congress to act quickly to
remove the underlying discrimination by mandating nationwide banking. It is only a matter of time before the ultimate level playing field of
nationwide commercial reached.

161. FLORIDA BANKING STUDY, supra note 117, at 215.
162. See supra notes 140-152 and accompanying text.
163. Golembe, supra note 86, at 14. The inadequacies of the regional approach
should be revealed after a thorough look by Congress and the banking industry.
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